Agent Orange was the code name for a herbicide developed for the military, primarily for use in tropical climates. Although the genesis of the product goes back to the 1940's, serious testing for military applications did not begin until the early 1960's.
The purpose of the product was to deny an enemy cover and concealment in dense terrain by defoliating trees and shrubbery where the enmy could hide. The product "Agent Orange" (a code name for the orange band that was used to mark the drums it was stored in, was principally effective against broad-leaf foliage, such as the dense jungle-like terrain found in Southeast Asia.
The product was tested in Vietnam in the early 1960's, and brought into ever widening use during the height of the war (1967-68), though it's use was diminished and eventually discontinued in 1971.
Agent Orange was a 50-50 mix of two chemicals, known conventionally as 2,4,D and 2,4,5,T. The combined product was mixed with kerosene or diesel fuel and dispersed by aircraft, vehicle, and hand spraying. An estimated 19 million gallons of Agent Orange were used in South Vietnam during the war.
The earliest health concerns about Agent Orange were about the product's contamination with TCDD, or dioxin. TCDD is one of a family of dioxins, some found in nature, and are cousins of the dibenzofurans and pcb's.
The TCDD found in Agent Orange is thought to be harmful to man. In laboratory tests on animals, TCDD has caused a wide variety of diseases, many of them fatal. TCDD is not found in nature, but rather is a man-made and always unwanted byproduct of the chemical manufacturing process. The Agent Orange used in Vietnam was later found to be extremely contaminated with TCDD
During the testing phase of Agent Orange, use tests were carried out at Fort Detrick, Maryland, Eglin Air Force Base in Florida, and Camp Drum in New York. Other testing was also conducted in Thailand in the early 1960's.
No. Title 38 of the United States Code prohibits veterans from suing the government for injuries suffered while in the military. A class action suit was filed in behalf of veterans in 1979 against the chemical companies and settled out of court. The final funds in this legal action were distributed by 1992. Additional attempts to sue the manufacturers have been attempted, and have been prohibited by the courts. The most strongly fought of these legal battles, Ivy vs. Diamond Shamrock was supported in behalf of the plaintiff by attorney generals in all fifty states, the Supreme Court, however, refused to hear the arguments and that case ended in 1992. In the parlance of the court, the issue is "res judicata" or "the matter is settled".
Also from the CIA:
We continue to conclude that Iraq did not use chemical weapons against Coalition forces. In our review of intelligence reporting and analysis of Iraq’s chemical agent stockpiles, we found no credible evidence of such use, and we were unable to corroborate any of the reported allegations of CW use in the Desert Storm time frame. On the basis of information on Iraqi Al Husayn (modified Scud) missile warheads recovered from both Saudi Arabia and Israel, we assess Iraq did not employ CW agents in warheads for Iraqi-modified Scud missiles. We believe no chemical bombs were used because Iraq was unable to attack Coalition troops with aircraft. The greatest potential threat was from chemical artillery shells and rockets because Iraqi units had the ability to fire these throughout the war and because these weapons had been stored at several locations south of Baghdad; even so, we do not believe these weapons were used, either. Intelligence information and UNSCOM accounting indicate that Iraqi 155-mm mustard shells were not moved to artillery units for use at the time of the ground war and about 13,000 shells remained at their storage areas near Khamisiyah and at Ukhaydir.13 In fact, Iraq claims—and intelligence corroborates—that during Desert Storm its troops moved thousands of 155-mm mustard shells and 122-mm nerve agent rockets out of bunkers and into the open to avoid contamination of their troops resulting from chemical weapon destruction by Coalition bombing.
On numerous occasions, Coalition troops reported detection of or exposure to CW agents during military operations in the Persian Gulf. Although some DoD investigations are incomplete, thus far the Intelligence Community does not link any of these reports to chemical agents or weapons. On the contrary, we assess these reports were the result of false alarms, conventional munitions, other chemicals such as missile propellants, and other factors (see appendix N). We continue to follow DoD research on relevant troop reporting.
Of note, we have recently revised our assessment on two well-known Coalition events—Czech CW detections in January 1991 and the blistering of a US soldier in March 1991—that the IC previously deemed to be credible CW events (see appendix N).
We assess that the Czech detections in question were unlikely to be from a chemical agent. New information and analyses indicate there is no chemical-agent source corresponding to the detections; moreover, there are other more likely causes associated with constraints of the Czech detection system. Although the IC and DoD originally discounted the Czechs’ Desert Storm–era reports, the IC has been studying these chemical-agent detections since a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)–sponsored team met with Czech Government officials in October 1993. This delegation was provided details of two detections—the detection of airborne nerve agent on 19 January and a mustard puddle on 24 January 1991. Largely on the basis of the Czech procedures and detectors used, the IC and DoD subsequently assessed these were credible chemical-agent detections—though unconfirmed by US detections—but we were unable to identify the source of the chemical agents for either detection. However, new information and analyses indicate chemical agents were not likely to have been the cause of what are now assessed to be at least four Czech detections.
In short, Iraqi forces didn't have Agent Orange. They had:
CS - a riot control gas
Cyclosarin - a nerve gas
sarin - also a nerve gas
sulfur mustard - causes burns and blistering
VX - a much more powerful nerve gas
The Coalition forces at the time didn't use chemical agents but instead favored things such as depleated uraniaum(DU) shells and basic tear gases in some places.
The biggest chances of exposure were from the destruction of Iraqi storage bunkers in which there are several reported cases of possible exposure to certain chemical agents, but still none of them are agent orange.
The entire idea of using agent orange in a desert is kinda silly when the entire point of the stuff is to kill vegetation. Also considering the other options available to the US and coalition forces at the time such as psychochemicals. Considered incapacitants, they include hallucinogenic compounds such as lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD), 3-quinuclidinyl benzilate (BZ), and benactyzine. These agents alter the nervous system, thereby causing visual and aural hallucinations, a sense of unreality, and changes in the thought processes and behavior.
They also have access to all the typical modern nerve agents, vomiting, blood, blister, and choking agents. To use a herbicide that needs to be air dropped to be truely effective would be pointless considering the other options. That and I doubt no soldier would have gone near the stuff considering what it did to people in Vietnam.
sorry for being so long winded
